Finally, we show that our protocol can properly adapt to different node arrival and departure events, and to different forms of network congestion. Experimental results are reported to illustrate that the protocol achieves its service differentiation objective and can induce productive information sharing by rational network nodes. To realize the game, we propose a protocol in which all competing nodes interact with the information providing node to reach Nash equilibrium in a dynamic and efficient manner. We show that this game has a Nash equilibrium and is collusion-proof. Second, we model the whole resource request and distribution process as a competition game between the competing nodes. Besides giving incentive, the mechanism distributes resources in a way that increases the aggregate utility of the whole network. The mechanism is driven by a distributed algorithm which has linear time complexity and guarantees Pareto-optimal resource allocation. We first introduce a resource distribution mechanism between all information sharing nodes. The objective of this work is to enable service differentiation in a P2P network based on the amount of services each node has provided to its community, thereby encouraging all network nodes to share resources. This leads to the "free-riding" and "tragedy of the commons" problems, in which the majority of information requests are directed towards a small number of P2P nodes willing to share their resources. Consequently, users can obtain services without themselves contributing any information or service to a P2P community. Traditional peer-to-peer (P2P) networks do not provide service differentiation and incentive for users. Based on our observations, we provide guidelines for seed provisioning by content providers, and discuss a tracker protocol extension that addresses an identified limitation of the protocol. In addition, our results show that BitTorrent's new choking algorithm in seed state provides uniform service to all peers, and that an underprovisioned initial seed leads to the absence of peer clustering and less effective sharing incentives. These include the clustering of similar-bandwidth peers, the effectiveness of BitTorrent's sharing incentives, and the peers' high average upload utilization. By observing the decisions of more than 40 nodes, we validate three BitTorrent properties that, though widely believed to hold, have not been demonstrated experimentally. We present the first experimental investigation of the peer selection strategy of the popular BitTorrent protocol in an instrumented private torrent.
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Consequently, it is important to gain a full understanding of how these protocols behave in practice and how their parameters impact overall performance. Peer-to-peer protocols play an increasingly instrumental role in Internet content distribution. Our model allows us to study the corresponding trade-offs between performance improvement, load on permanent seeders, and content availability, which we leave for future work. This eliminates the threat of extinction of rare segments which is prevented by the needed presence of permanent seeders. The result is that leechers are further enticed to cooperate. We discuss how alternative dissemination rules may beneficially increase file acquisition times causing leechers to remain in the system longer (particularly as temporary seeders). With our model, we show that the rarest-segment first rule minimizes transition time to seeder (complete file acquisition) and equalizes the segment populations in steady-state. Using a simple epidemic model for a two segment BitTorrent swarm, we focus on the BitTorrent rule to disseminate the (locally) rarest segments first. Seeder peers essentially operate outside the BitTorrent incentives, with two caveats: slow downlinks lead to increased numbers of "temporary" seeders (who left their console, but will terminate their seeder role when they return), and the copyright liability boon that file segmentation offers for permanent seeders. Despite its existing incentives for leecher cooperation, BitTorrent file sharing fundamentally relies on the presence of seeder peers.
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